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On the Very Problem of the Problem of God
in Zubiri and Unamuno*
Brad Elliott Stone
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California, USA
Abstract
Perhaps one innovation brought about by Spanish philosophy is the notion that “God”
names a problem instead of an entity. This is what Xavier Zubiri means when he uses the
phrase “the problem of God.” Although he does not employ the Zubirian phrase, Miguel de
Unamuno also addresses God as a problem. This paper compares Zubiri’s and Unamuno’s
accounts of how God appears to human beings polemically. For both thinkers, God is a
problem only for human beings; there is something about the structure of human existence
that makes God come to mind. For Zubiri, God comes to mind because human beings find
themselves implanted into reality. For Unamuno, God comes to mind because human beings understand their own mortality and seek to overcome it. After presenting their respective views on the structures of human beings that account for the problem of God, the philosophical implications of such a view are explored. If we take Zubiri and Unamuno to be
correct about “the very problem of the problem of God,” true theism would not be evidentialist (this is the way “theism” works in traditional philosophy of religion). Also, true atheism (the claim that God does not exist) would be impossible, for even if the entity called
“God” does not in fact exist, “God” as a problem (the problem of God) does.
Resumen
Quizás una innovación provocada por filosofía española es la noción de que “Dios” refiere a un problema en vez de una entidad. Esto es lo que Xavier Zubiri quiere decir al usar
la frase “el problema de Dios”. Aunque él no emplea la frase zubiriana, Miguel de Unamuno también se dirige a Dios como un problema. Este ensayo compara el pensamiento de
Zubiri y de Unamuno en torno a cómo Dios aparece polémicamente a los seres humanos.
Para ambos pensadores, Dios es sólo un problema para los seres humanos; hay algo sobre
la estructura de existencia humana que hace que Dios venga a la mente. Para Zubiri, Dios
viene a la mente porque los seres humanos se encuentran implantado en realidad. Para
Unamuno, Dios viene a la mente porque los seres humanos entienden su propia mortalidad
y buscan superarlo. Después de presentar sus vistas respectivas de las estructuras humanas que explican el problema de Dios, se exploran las implicaciones filosóficas de tales vistas. Si supongamos que Zubiri y Unamuno sean correctos sobre “el problema mismo del
problema de Dios,” el verdadero teísmo no sería evidentialista (ésta es la manera en que el
“teísmo” funciona en la filosofía tradicional de la religión). También, el verdadero ateísmo (la
demanda de que Dios no existe) sería imposible, ya que aun cuando la entidad llamó que
“Dios” no exista de hecho, “Dios” como un problema (el problema de Dios) sí existe.

*

In honor of Charles C. Seabrook, who introduced me to the wonderful philosophical tradition of
Spain through an advanced Spanish grammar lesson
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La oración del ateo

The Atheist’s Prayer

Oye mi ruego Tú, Dios que no existes,
y en tu nada recoje estas mis quejas,
Tú que a los pobres hombres nunca dejas
sin consuelo de engaño. No resistes

Hear my prayer you nonexisting God,
and in your nothingness take up my laments,
you who never leaves poor men
without deceptive consolation. You do not resist

a nuestro ruego y nuestro anhelo vistes.
Cuando Tú de mi mente más te alejas,
más recuerdo las plácidas consejas,
con que mi ama endulzóme noches tristes.

our prayers and you disguise our desires.
The more you move yourself away from my mind,
the more I remember the placid fables
used by my mom to comfort me on sad nights.

¡Qué grande eres, mi Dios! Eres tan grande
que no eres sino Idea; es muy angosta
la realidad por mucho que se espande
para acabarte. Sufro yo a tu costa,
Dios no existente, pues si Tú existieras
existiría yo también de veras.

Introduction
For Spanish existentialists, “God” is
the name of a problem, not an entity (theology deals with the entity).
In other
words, the problem is not what God is, or
what the problem of God is; rather, it is
that God is a problem (for theists and
atheists alike). Why do we even talk about
God? This is what I refer to as “the very
problem of the problem of God.” The very
problem of the problem of God is directly
tied to another great problem, the problem
of being human. “Being human” is the
name of the problem in which we find ourselves. I maintain that “the problem of
being human” is equivalent to “the very
problem of the problem of God;” that is, it
is insofar as we are human beings that
“God” is a problem. I shall not explore
“the very problem of the problem of being
human” here since this essay is on God,
but it might be easiest to explain it by referring to Heidegger’s Being and Time as a
good treatise on the issue.
Ever since Seneca and St. Isidore of
Seville, the question of what it means to be
a human being (in a sense different than

How great you are, my God! You are so great
that you are nothing but an idea; reality is steadfast,
no matter how much one tries to force
you to come to an end. I suffer at your expense,
nonexisting God, for if you were to exist
then I would truly also exist.1

“rational animal”) has been posed most
intensely, and most intimately, by thinkers
from the Iberian Peninsula. For the Spanish philosopher, the problem of being human and the problem of God are inseparable. Failure to take up one of the problems results in the incapacity to take up
the other. “God” is meaningless without
human beings, and “human beings” are
only such in light of God. Within the
Spanish tradition, it seems that atheism is
a kind of misanthropy, and a hatred of life
is blasphemous.
Two 20th century Spanish existentialists offer the most congruency between the
problem of God and the problem of being
human. The philosopher who emphasizes
this dual problematic most systematically
is Xavier Zubiri, whose conception of “religation” explains the existential constitution of human life, the divine nature of
God, and the origin of religions. Miguel de
Unamuno, although not as systematic as
Zubiri, yet definitely more passionate,
views God and human life as mutual creative processes. In his account, humans
make God and God makes them; creation
is a mutual process.

XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2004

On the Very Problem of the Problem of God in Zubiri and Unamuno

75

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

The similarities between these two
thinkers go beyond the fact that they are
both of Basque descent. Neither accepts
the traditional proofs for the existence of
God as useful for truly understanding the
problem of God. As a consequence of the
failures of these proofs, mere rejection of
them does not constitute atheism. Both
hold that the human condition is a constitutive part of the idea of God. Neither believes that true atheism is possible, for
being human automatically makes one
have the problem of God, so atheists and
theists both face the problem of God.
In this essay, I present Zubiri and
Unamuno’s respective views on the unity
of being human and God as well as the
refutation of theism and atheism, traditionally conceived, that results from those
views. By doing so, I will offer a different,
more Spanish way of thinking about humans, God, and the relationship between
the two. To these ends, this essay is composed of four sections.
In the first section, I explicate Zubiri’s
jointure of the problem of being human
(religation) to the problem of God (deity).
Section two discusses Unamuno’s union of
the tragic sense of life (the problem of being human) and God (the problem of God).
The point of these first two sections is to
show that, for both thinkers, the problem
of God is the direct consequence of the
problem of being human. Only human
beings are religious; “God” names an important fact about being human.
Sections three and four explore the
consequences of understanding God in
Spanish existentialist terms. These consequences challenge traditional philosophy
of religion and call it back to its proper
grounding. The third section deals with
the critique of theistic evidentialism that
comes along with understanding the problem of God in terms of the problem of being human. For the theistic evidentialist,
God’s existence is provable by demonstration.
There have been many different
demonstrations produced in the history of
philosophy; the three main ones are the

ontological, cosmological, and teleological
proofs for the existence of God. However,
given that God is connected to the problem
of being human, these proofs miss the
mark and prove something different from
the God expressed in this essay. Therefore, I will argue that theistic evidentialist
arguments are insufficient for, if not detrimental to, true belief in God. Zubiri argues that such proofs only prove divinity
and therefore fail to prove God. Unamuno
worries that theistic proofs actually prove
the wrong God, who Unamuno calls the
“God-Idea,” who is in reality no God at all.
The second consequence for the philosophy of religion is that arguments
against the existence of God are equally
insufficient. First of all, given that theistic
arguments are insufficient, merely pointing out that insufficiency cannot be atheism. Second, and this is the bigger thrust
of the section, atheism is itself a position
inside of the problem of God. Atheists fail
to see that the nonexistence of God only
matters to the atheist insofar as the atheist is already religated to God through the
problem of being human. In other words,
atheism is one of the solutions to the
problem of God. This, of course, does not
remove the problem called “God.” Zubiri
argues that atheism is solipsistic selfdivinization, and is therefore unsustainable. Unamuno sees the atheist as a desperate person frustrated by the difficulties
of proving God’s existence. However, once
evidentialism is defeated, atheists will not
have to despair about not finding proof,
and true atheism is defeated.
I. Zubiri: Religation, Deity, Divinity,
God
For Zubiri, being human means to
find oneself implanted in existence. This
implantation is understood in terms of
what Zubiri calls “religation.” The problem
of being human is for Zubiri the problem
of being religated. Since religation is an
imposition, one must inquire into the imposer. This is the very problem of the pro-
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blem of God. Zubiri explores the problem
of God in terms of “deity” (the power of
reality, which imposes itself onto us), “divinity” (the foundation of deity), and “God”
(the absolutely absolute personal reality
who gives reality its impressive force
through love.). In this section, I will explain Zubiri’s conception of religation, deity, divinity, and God.
Humans, like other animals, are sentient creatures. Everything we encounter
is encountered through our senses. Sensing is composed of three moments according to Zubiri: affection, the moment of
otherness, and the force of imposition.
Affection is the aspect of sensation in
which “the sentient being ‘suffers’ the impression.”2 This element is uncontroversial, and most traditional philosophy
starts (and unfortunately ends) here.
The moment of otherness is the aspect
of sensation in which impression “is the
presentation of something other in affection.”3 Zubiri calls the other which presents itself in affection a note. Notes are
not qualities, but things that are “noted”
(noticed) in experience. For example, for
animals that only see in black and white,
“red” is not “noted” and therefore is not
part of the sensation of an object (even if
the object is “red” to those animals who
“notice” color).
The force of imposition is the aspect of
sensation in which “the note present in
the affection imposes itself upon the sentient being” and “arouses the process of
sensing.”4 We do not get to pick what is
noticed; something is either a note or it is
not. If something is a note, it imposed
itself in sensation. By virtue of this imposition, the note is “noted.” Affection, the
moment of otherness, and the force of imposition, although they are three different
aspects of sensation, are unified in a singular event of sensing.
So far, Zubiri’s account of sensation
(which Zubiri calls “sensible apprehension”) shows no differentiation between
humans and other animals. The difference, Zubiri writes, has to do with a differentiation in the modes of sensible appre-

hension. For animals, sensation merely
serves as the experience of stimuli. The
stimulus affects the animal; the animal
responds accordingly. The example Zubiri
gives is how animals respond to heat.
Animals receive the stimulus “is warming”
as a note imposed upon them as other. If
the animal is seeking heat, it welcomes
this “is warming” and draws towards the
heat source; if the animal is too hot, it
flees from the “is warming.” In very simple
creatures, response to stimuli is instantaneous; in more complex animals (including
humans when interpreted biologically),
there is the power of “hesitation” (to use
Bergson’s phrasing) that increases the
more complex the creature. For example,
even though I am hot in a sauna, I do not
run away from it; I can hesitate.
Human beings, although they do receive and respond to stimuli, do something
more in the moment of sensing. Zubiri
argues that humans sense reality along
with the stimuli. To return to the note of
heat, of course humans experience the “is
warming,” but they also experience “heat,”
which is more than “is warming.” Rather,
it is heat de suyo (in its own right). This
“in its own right” is the reality of a given
note. Humans can separate the heat from
the source and let the heat be de suyo; it
is because of this humans are capable of
studying thermodynamics, for example.5
Therefore, humans have the affection
of reality. The moment of otherness is the
de suyo of a note. The note has an “in its
own right” that makes it other than me.
Animals, although they do experience the
“other than me” of certain stimuli, fail to
understand the “in its own right” of the
stimuli. For humans, on the other hand, a
note is “in and for itself … heat is a way
included in the sentient process, but only
because it already is heat. Heat as something de suyo is … prior to its being present in sensing.”6 In terms of the force of
imposition, “what is apprehended is imposed upon me with … the force of reality.”7 Reality forces itself upon me in the
sensation of notes that are “in their own
right” my apprehension of things.
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Human beings, unlike animals, apprehend reality, the de suyo of notes that
impose themselves on humans as something other. We are “implanted in reality.”8 This implantation is what Zubiri
calls “religation.” Religation is the “seizure
by the power of the real.”9 “The real”
which has power over human beings is not
a quality or property of the things humans
experience; it, too, is de suyo. “The real” is
enigmatic (Levinasian enough yet?); we
experience that things are real, but reality
de suyo of those things eludes us (except
in certain cases related to our own reality
as persons). The problem of being human,
the very problem of the problem of God,
lies in this seizure by the power of reality
de suyo. The problem of our humanity is
that “we are founded in an enigma, the
enigma of the power of the real.”10 This
enigma makes our life a mystery, leaving
us to ask existential questions—e.g.,
“What is going to become of me?” and
“What am I going to make of myself?”11
Reality de suyo is an enigma that makes
us who we are and grounds everything we
experience. Therefore, everything is religated by the power of the real; the catch is
that only humans experience that fact.
The problem of reality is “formally the
problem of God. What religation manifests
experientially and enigmatically is God as
a problem. The problem of God belongs …
to the constitution of my own person.”12
The problem of being human is the problem that brings us to the problem of God.
Zubiri explores the problem of God in
terms of a successive trio: deity, divinity,
God.
Deity is the name Zubiri gives to “this
ultimate, possibilitating, impelling power
[of reality].”13 In other words, “deity” is the
name of the enigmatic power of the real. It
is found in humans not as something extra to experience (that is religation), but as
the foundation of all experiences.
As
Zubiri writes, “[m]an does not have experience of deity, but rather is the very experience of deity in his own substantive being
… The personal act of religation is pure

and simply the experience of deity.”14 In
other words, “religation,” the problem of
being human, is the same as “deity,” the
very problem of the problem of God. The
problem of God is simply the exploration of
the question “what constitutes this deity
in which humans find themselves?” Notice that this means that “deity” is not
equivalent to “God.” All that has been
shown so far is that the problem of being
human (the problem of being implanted in
reality) and the very problem of the problem of God (the problem of reality de suyo)
are linked together, therefore establishing
for Zubiri the congruence of being human
and God.
From deity, one can move to “divinity.”
Divinity is “that fundament*, which undoubtedly belongs to reality without being
deity, but is precisely the fundament of the
deity of things.”15 This is demonstrable, as
is done in arguments for God’s existence.
All these proofs do is show that reality is
really real, distinct from “subjective” experiences of it; nothing more, nothing less.
Zubiri is quick to remind us that divinity
“is not sufficient for reaching God, because
a very important question remains unanswered. Is the first cause that which men
call “God”, that to which man directs himself not only with demonstration, but will
all his acts of submission, prayer, etc.? …
who is the first cause?”16 As I will explain
in section three, Aquinas’s jump to God
from “unmoved mover,” “first cause,” etc.
is too big of a leap to make. Although
Aquinas is right—God will be those
things—he seems to equate the terms
“divinity” and “God.” This is an error.
After all, the unmoved mover can be “me”
if I am a solipsist. We have to see the
“who” of divinity as something de suyo.
God is beyond divinity, and cannot
be demonstrated. Zubiri writes that God
is “absolutely absolute reality … it depends on nothing, not even that on which
*

The word “fundament” is sometimes used in
place of “ground” to translate the Spanish
fundamento.
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every human person depends, to wit, his
nature … but is rather a free act. The first
cause as a personal and free reality: here
we at last have God.”17 This can only be
affirmed by faith, which Zubiri describes
in terms of donation—love. God is the
giver of reality, and humans are the recipients of that reality. We have faith in God
when we believe that the reality in which
we find ourselves implanted is a gift and
not a curse, an obligation and not a causal
determinism; faith in God means seeing
human beings as a finite moment of God,
a participant in reality.18 To believe in God
is to acknowledge the reality we find ourselves in and to embrace our religation.
This is why for Zubiri God is an experience
of being human, and being human is an
experience of God.19
II. Unamuno: The Tragic Sense of God
Like Zubiri, Unamuno sees the problem of being human as a prerequisite to
approaching the problem of God.
Although not as systematic as Zubiri, Unamuno is definitely more passionate about
the relationship between human beings
and God. Unamuno’s main philosophical
opus, Tragic Sense of Life, outlines the
relationship between human beings and
God. Unamuno starts by explaining the
tragic sense of life as the problem of being
human. Human beings, who for Unamuno are concrete people “of flesh and
bone,” seek immortality against the
awareness of their deaths. This fight for
immortality opens up the problem of God,
and God is described as a concrete, sentient volition for the eternity of human
existence.
For Unamuno, human beings are defined tragically and concretely. To show
that Unamuno is concerned with human
beings in a non-abstract way, Unamuno
uses the term “the man of flesh and bone”
to describe a human life. The man of flesh
and bone is described as one who “is born,
suffers, and dies—above all, who dies.”20
The important fact about being human is
that humans are mortal; we die, and we

are aware of that fact—this is what makes
us human in comparison to other animals.
Yes, animals die, but it is not a fact of
their existence.
Therefore, like Zubiri,
Unamuno focuses on a formal, modal distinction here. Like animals, humans die;
unlike animals, we devote our life to thinking about, worrying over, and overcoming
death.
The essence of being human, however,
is not in the fact that we die. Instead, the
essence of being human is the desire to
never die. Using Spinoza’s definition of res
from Ethics, Bk. III, Unamuno writes that
“[e]verything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being … This
means that your essence, reader, mine, …
and of every man who is a man, is nothing
but the endeavor, the effort, which he
makes to continue to be a man, not to
die.”21 The essence of being human is the
struggle to forever continue existing.
Unamuno describes two aspects of being a
human being, two aspects which must
remain in order to have the immortality he
desires: unity and continuity.
By unity, Unamuno is thinking of the
body and its spatiality. We are always
“focused” on something and direct our
action toward things. Unamuno writes
that “a man is so much the more a man
the more unitary his action. There are
some who throughout their whole life follow but one single purpose, be it what it
may.”22 Therefore, human beings not only
desire mere immortality (e.g., the immortality of the soul), but actual corporeal
perpetuity. What worries us about death
is the dread of “having to tear myself away
from my flesh … from everything sensible
and material.”23 We are of flesh and bone—remove the flesh and the bones, and
we are not.
By continuity, Unamuno is thinking of
the Bergsonian notion of memory.24 Unamuno writes that “memory is the basis of
the individual personality … We live in
memory and by memory, and our spiritual
life is at bottom simply an effort of our
memory to persist.”25 We are memory.
The meaning of eternal life is to always be
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remembered, and to always be remembering.
At death, it is assumed that one loses
both unity and continuity. For the man of
flesh and bone, this idea is revolting. As
Unamuno writes, “[i]f consciousness is …
nothing more than a flash of light between
two eternities of darkness, then there is
nothing more execrable than existence.”26
In other words, life is pointless and without worth if it is indeed mortal. Life is
indeed mortal; therefore, by modus ponens, life is worthlessly pointless.
The essence of being human, Unamuno argues, is to deny the conclusion of
this argument, even though it is both valid
and sound. In short, the essence of being
human is a contradiction between the
head and the heart, between reason and
volition, which “express[es] a longing for
unending life, [yet] now affirm[s] that this
earthly life does not possess the value that
is given to it.”27 This is the tragic sense of
life, the absurd battle for immortality.
The very problem of the problem of
God is the tragic sense of life. Unamuno
notes that all civilizations have the hunger
for immortality in one form or another. In
short, as Unamuno exclaims, “I do not
want to die—no; I neither want to die nor
do I want to want to die; I want to live forever and ever and ever.”28 Everything human beings do, including philosophy and
religion, screams this mantra over and
over. Unamuno uses the example of the
artist to prove his point here: “a man who
tells you that he writes, paints, sculpts, or
sings for his own amusement … lies … He
wishes … to leave behind a shadow of his
spirit.”29 We seek eternity, and this eternity must preserve the unity and continuity of our being. Unamuno writes that “[i]f
at the death of my body … my consciousness returns to the absolute unconsciousness from which it sprang … our toil-worn
human race … [is] the most inhuman
thing known.”30
Being human is the very problem of
the problem of God. Animals do not have
the problem of God, presumably, because

they lack the tragic sense of life and the
hunger for immortality. God’s existence
matters to human beings because human
beings are aware of their being, and therefore seek its unity and continuity forever.
Unamuno offers the following anecdote to
show how tied together the hunger for
immortality and the problem of God are:
Talking to a peasant one day, I proposed to him the hypothesis that there
might indeed be a God who governs
heaven and earth, a Consciousness of
the Universe, but that for all that the
soul of every man may not be immortal in the traditional and concrete
sense. He replies: “Then wherefore
God?”31
What is the point of God if there is no
hope for immortality?
For Unamuno,
“God” is the name of that hope, that humanly concrete hope, of being oneself
eternally. God is born from the projection
of human hope into the universe. Unamuno reminds us that “[t]he divine … was
not originally something projective, but
was rather the subjectivity of consciousness projected exteriorly, the personalization of the world.”32 Belief in God is the
hope of immortality, in whatever form it is
conceived throughout history. We want to
be “God”—to be immortal. “God” is the
name of our hatred of nothingness and the
power of life over nihilism. Through God,
human beings are created immortally, so
that “if you believe in God, God believes in
you, and believing in you He creates you
continually.”33 One’s unity is preserved in
the constant sustaining, and one is remembered and remembering in God.
Like Zubiri’s move from divinity to
God, Unamuno argues that faith is the
only way to access God. Like with Zubiri,
faith involves a personal relationship.
Faith, Unamuno writes, “is not the mere
adherence of the intellect to an abstract
principle;” instead, it is a creation of God,
who in turn creates us, and is therefore
“continually creating Himself in us.”34
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Said differently, “God and man, in effect,
mutually create one another; God creates
or reveals Himself in man and man creates
himself in God. God is His own maker.”35
And therefore we are in God, not with God.
God is the highest expression of being
human: immortal and concrete.
Unamuno’s account of God on the one
hand seems to lack the philosophical, systematic structure found in Zubiri’s account of religation, but, on the other hand,
better sets the stage for why the very problem of the problem of God is so important
and yet so neglected in traditional philosophy of religion. Whereas Zubiri shows
us how human beings move from religation/deity to divinity and ultimately to
God, Unamuno shows us why human
beings pursue God. How and why are
that questions still unasked by philosophy
of religion, which is still too focused on
what questions.
III. Against Theistic Evidentialism
Having explicated Zubiri and Unamuno’s respective existentialist accounts
of God, I now address two consequences of
their positions. The first consequence,
which will be discussed in this section, is
that the theistic evidentialist proofs for
God’s existence, insofar as they fail to account for the very problem of the problem
of God, fail to prove God’s existence. The
second consequence, explored in section
four, is that true atheism is impossible.
Both of these consequences come from the
same root issue: both theism and atheism
fail to acknowledge the very problem of the
problem of God; in other words, theism
and atheism are both inside of the problem of God.
In this section I start with Unamuno’s
argument against what he calls “the GodIdea.” For Unamuno, traditional philosophy of religion, insofar as it refuses to acknowledge the tragic sense of life and the
concrete man of flesh and bone, misses
God entirely and replaces God with “God,”
an empty metaphysical concept. I conclude by describing Zubiri’s criticism of

the traditional proofs of God’s existence.
For Zubiri, traditional philosophy of religion is untrue to the sensible apprehension
of reality that is given to humans, thus
replacing reality de suyo (which leads to
God) with the metaphysical (incorrect)
notion of reality as being. It is this reality
as being that Aquinas inherits from Aristotle, which causes his proofs to demonstrate a God that cannot be worshipped.
Unamuno
When it comes to religious matters,
Unamuno believes that philosophy (traditionally conceived) is unhelpful and useless as a method. First of all, true philosophy (whose deficient mode is “philosophy” as we have come to know it) is a human activity that results from the tragic
sense of life. To use philosophy to describe and solve the problem of God would
be to put the effect before the cause. Humans philosophize because we suffer from
the very problem of the problem of God;
the problem of God is prior to philosophy.
Second, as Unamuno writes, “[t]he will
and the intelligence seek opposite ends.”36
“Philosophy” excludes the will, and, therefore, excludes forthright the very problem
of the problem of God, which is better understood in terms of a volition than a
thought. “Philosophy” cannot accept its
origin in the hunger for immortality, the
selfsame hunger that originally makes God
come to mind. Unamuno is very clear
about the fact that God will have to be a
granter or guarantor of immortality in order to be significant to human beings.
The God proven in the philosophy of
religion is unable to do this. Unamuno
writes that the “traditional so-called proofs
of the existence of God all refer to [the]
God-idea … and hence they really prove
nothing.”37 All these proofs do, to use Zubiri’s term, is prove that there is a ground
to reality.
But, for Unamuno, reality
means nothing if life is pointless. Whereas
Zubiri allows room for demonstration and
reason at the move from deity to divinity,
Unamuno is more suspicious of our intellectual capacities, preferring sentiment
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over reason. In other words, God must
not only provide for the existence of the
world, but also give human life purpose (in
a non-teleological way) through immortality. As Unamuno states, “the God who
confers human meaning and finality upon
the Universe and who is not the ens summum, the primum movens, nor the Creator
of the Universe, nor merely the Idea-God.
It leads us to the living, subjective God, for
He is simply subjectivity objectified or personality universalized.”38 God as the highest being, or the first mover—or any of the
Thomist nomenclatures—cannot confer
meaning on human life. The God that
matters, Unamuno tells us, is the objectivity of subjectivity, the absolute expression
of being-a-subject, and the universalization of personality, the highest expression
of being-a-person.
The reason why such proofs fail,
Unamuno writes, is that philosophy pretends to be free of personality and subjectivity. As a result, the philosophical understanding of what it means to be a human being is wrong, and, a fortiori, the
philosophical understanding of God. The
philosophical understanding of being human is simply non-human. As Unamuno
writes,
[T]here is another thing [other than
“the man of flesh and bone”] which is
also called man, and he is the subject
of not a few lucubrations, more or less
scientific. He is the legendary featherless biped, the zōon politikon of Aristotle, the social contractor of Rousseau, the homo economicus of the
Manchester school, the homo sapiens
of Linnaeus, or, if you like, the vertical
mammal. A man neither of here nor
there, neither of this age or another,
who has neither sex nor country, who
is, in brief, merely an idea. That is to
say, a no-man.39
Given that this idea of human being is
a “no-man,” the God of this approach is
also nothing. Unamuno writes that the
philosophical God “is the projection to the

outward infinite of man as he is by definition—that is to say, of the abstract man, of
the man no-man” whereas the God we
pursue “is the projection to the inward
infinite of man as he is by life, of the concrete man, the man of flesh and bone.”40
It is important to note that both Gods
work the same way; God in both cases is
the infinite projection of the human being
described in each case. When being human is understood abstractly (outwardly),
God is abstract, dead, and immortal only
in the way that ideas are; when being human is understood concretely (inwardly),
God is alive, concrete, and immortal in the
fullest sense. Philosophical theists prove
the existence of the God of the no-man,
the abstract “no-God,” who “neither loved
nor hated, because He neither enjoyed nor
suffered, an inhuman God … that is, an
injustice.”41 It is the direct result of conceiving of being human in terms that make
emotions and concrete situations accidental instead of essential.
Therefore, the move to God cannot be
rational or demonstrative. Reason, Unamuno sates, “separates us from [God]. We
cannot first know Him in order that afterwards we may love Him; we must begin by
loving Him … before knowing Him …
knowledge of God proceeds from the love
of God … To seek to define Him is to seek
to confine Him … to kill Him.”42 By starting with knowing, the philosophy of religion fails to explain both the motive for the
pursuit of God and why anyone should
love God, or why God should love us. Take, for example, the proof that God made
the world because God is an intelligent
designer. Unamuno reminds us that “[w]e
do not understand the existence of the
world one whit the better by telling ourselves that God created it.”43 Humans are
looking for a God that gives purpose to life,
which helps one understand the world, not
a mere trivial fact about its creator.
Zubiri
Like Unamuno, Zubiri argues that in
reducing God’s existence to proofs one is
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losing the importance of God in the first
place. In other words, by reducing God to
one more object of speculative reasoning,
one loses the fact that one is exploring
God’s existence in the first place. Theists
and atheists alike have to be able to explain why it is that God is of such a concern to them. By already making arguments for and against God’s existence, the
fundamental issue of religiation/deity is
already overlooked. The theist position
means nothing to those who really believe
in God, nor does it persuade in the slightest those who really do not believe in God.
We can see this in theistic proofs insofar as they work only for those who already expect them to do so. The example
Zubiri gives us is the famous passage from
Summa Theologica in which Aquinas discusses the proofs of God’s existence.44
Zubiri states that the point of that question is not really to prove God’s existence
(that part is actually uncontroversial for
Aquinas and his contemporaries); rather,
it is to show that the proposition “God
exists” is not analytic and is therefore in
need of an a posteriori demonstration.
This allows Aquinas to prove divinity correctly given the way humans are religated.
But, of course, Aquinas gives no arguments for the religation of humans, nor
does he move from divinity to God. To
Aquinas’s credit, the reason he gives no
proof for the religation of humans was
because Aquinas and his peers already
had the notion of divinity; that is, they
acknowledged that God is a problem. Zubiri claims that “since there was no question for the men of his epoch and environs
that someone was coming, it was natural
that St. Thomas should pass over this
point limiting himself to a statement of
evidence, in order to delve into the question of who it is that comes.”45 Of course,
in all reality, Aquinas never gets to who is
coming because he never gets past divinity
unless “…and this is what we call ‘God’” is
a moment of faith. But Aquinas is not
professing faith here; rather, he is claiming to demonstrate God’s existence by
pointing the reader back to the standard

definition of God qua entity. Granted,
“God” is the correct answer; but Aquinas’s
demonstration is faulty. In our age, one
does not have to make the leap to God to
answer the question of “who” the prime
mover, the first cause, etc. is. We moderns can easily answer “the laws of physics,” thus not only not moving from divinity to God, but also removing the point of
divinity in the first place. The “who” for
Aquinas can be replaced by a “what.”
However, if we start with religation/deity,
such a move to physics is frustrated. The
“who” is personal because we are persons;
our reality is personal, implanted into existence by reality itself, which is also a
person. And, in spite of Aquinas, this is
what we mean by the word “God.”
Zubiri writes the following in an attempt to explain where Aquinas erred:
I am not maintaining that the five arguments are invalid. Rather, I am
saying that contrary to what is expressly affirmed in them, they do not
start from facts but from something
quite different, namely, from a metaphysical interpretation of sensible reality … the basis of St. Thomas’ discussion is not the facts but the metaphysics of Aristotle, which for St. Thomas
is reason itself … [But] the metaphysics of Aristotle is neither of common
sense nor a datum of experience.46
Reason clouds the facts, namely, the
fact of being human. God can be understood because there are facts about being
human which point us straight to the problem of God. For Unamuno, it is the tragic sense of life; for Zubiri, it is the sensible apprehension of reality. Therefore, the
point of departure is wrong; Aquinas fails
to account for the true facts of the matter.
For example, in the teleological argument,
Aquinas correctly notes that we sense that
nature has “design,” but fails to explain
why humans are the kind of beings that
seek design (the answer: religation/deity –
we sense the reality of the world as organized other, but that is not metaphysics;
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rather, it is the concrete way humans find
themselves implanted in existence).
In terms of religion, it is clear that the
God that is worshipped, prayed to, etc.
does not fit the descriptions Aquinas attributes to God. As Zubiri writes, “the
theos of Aristotle has no religious significance whatever … No one can address a
prayer to the unmoved mover, at least
unless you add a few other things.”47 In
other words, when Aquinas says “and this
is what we call ‘God,’” there is clearly a
large gap between the thing Aquinas
proves (unmoved mover, first cause, etc.)
and who he worships. Stated differently,
“to the God of Aristotle no one can address
supplications, or ask for help; he moves
without being moved as the object of love
and desire.”48 The God that founds reality,
however, is praiseworthy, because God is
the experience of being human. When we
worship God, we worship the whole of reality, a reality that only we as humans
(and God) are privy to.
Unamuno and Zubiri are both correct
for questioning traditional theism.
By
failing to account for human religation (the
tragic sense of life), the God that results is
incomplete; not only incompletely demonstrated, but unworthy of worship. Our
relationship to God—the only way God
matters to human beings—requires more
than this. A true theism requires an acknowledgment of the tragic sense of life
(religation) so as to provide the correct
starting point for our pursuit of God. Insofar as we have the correct starting point,
we are only then able to have the correct
end: a God with whom we can enter into
relationship, worship, and ultimately
through that worship, reaffirm what it
means to be human. To use the phrase
often cited at Loyola Marymount University, “the Kingdom of God is a human being fully alive.” This is not surprising:
LMU is a Jesuit institution, and the Jesuits are a Spanish order.

IV. The Impossibility of True Atheism
In the previous section, the insistence
on rational proofs for God’s existence leads
to the wrong God—an abstract God that is
incapable of being worshipped or entered
into a relationship. In this section I move
to the second consequence of Zubiri and
Unamuno’s existentialist accounts of God.
I argue that true atheism is impossible
given the fact that humans are religated in
the tragic sense of life.
There are two ways, perhaps, to consider oneself an atheist. One would be to
not consider the proofs of God’s existence
sufficient to warrant theistic belief. In
section three we have already shown that
theistic evidentialist proofs fail, yet Zubiri,
Unamuno, and I believe that God exists.
Therefore, rejection of rational proofs for
God’s existence cannot constitute atheism.
The second way to be an atheist is to offer
a rational proof that God does not exist, as
one finds, for example, in the problem of
evil. The problem of evil shows that God
does not exist by using a reductio ad absurdum argument:
1. Assume God exists.
2. God can stop evil if God wants to
because God is omnipotent.
3. God wants to stop evil because God
is benevolent.
4. Evil remains [unstopped].
5. Therefore, God is either unable to
stop evil or does not want to stop
evil.
6. If God is unable to stop evil, then
God is not omnipotent.
7. If God does not want to stop evil,
then God is not benevolent.
8. Premises 6 and 7 contradict premises 2 and 3.
9. Therefore, God does not exist.
The main problem with this objection
is that it disproves the existence of God
from God’s own definition, which presup-
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poses that the definition of “God” being
used is the correct one. If it is, then the
ontological argument of St. Anselm would
prove God’s existence, because the atheist
knows what “God” means. Although both
Zubiri and Unamuno have defenses of
God’s existence against the problem of
evil, I will instead focus on the fact that
atheism is only possible inside of the problem of God.
I will start with Zubiri’s claim that
atheism is only possible within the problem of God. Zubiri believes that the atheist is religated by the power of reality (deity), and is capable of understanding reality de suyo (divinity). So, the question of
“who” remains, and the atheist does not
answer the question with “God.” I will
then turn to Unamuno, who claims that
atheists are people who are stuck in the
evidentialist rut of theistic proofs. Out of
the despair of not being able to prove
God’s existence, or getting the right God in
those proofs, the atheist simply gives up
the struggle.
Zubiri
Zubiri describes atheism as simply
being “a negative position before the deity”
because “[e]ven the intent to deny all reality to that which founds [existence] … is
metaphysically impossible without the
realm of deity.”49 In order to claim that
something has existence or not requires
that human beings be the kind of beings
who find themselves in reality; that is,
religated. Therefore, any statement about
“what there is” (or “what there is not”) requires the power of the real—deity. The
atheist claim that God does not exist is
only possible due to deity itself, the power
of the real that imposes itself upon human
beings as other through affection.
For
Zubiri, “[t]o admit the existence of an ultimate reality—call it what you will—is not
a question of option.”50 Human beings are
implanted in existence and are obligated to
create themselves. We did not ask to be
here. To use a Heideggerian term out of
context (and Zubiri objects to this term for
other reasons), we are thrown into the

world and face its reality head on. In other words, “not having a religion” is a religion, a way of understanding one’s religation to deity, and is therefore “a real and
positive option just as much as being a
Buddhist or a Catholic or a Muslim can
be.”51
Zubiri claims that some call themselves “atheists” incorrectly. Simply saying that God is not the way traditional
philosophy has described him, after all, is
not atheism. Nor is the rejection of the
Judeo-Christian-Islamic God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob. It just means that one
is not a part of those religious traditions.
Since theism for Zubiri is the understanding of religation and deity, atheism has to
also address these areas.
Zubiri writes that atheism is best described as the rejection of the fact of religation:
The possibility of atheism is the possibility of feeling “unbound.”
And
what makes this feeling possible is the
“sufficiency” of the person for making
himself through the successful outcome of his efforts at living. The successful outcome of life is the great
creator of atheism. The radical confidence, the trusting to one’s own abilities for living, and the “unbinding”
oneself from everything are one and
the same thing.52
Zubiri points to radical self-confidence
as the essence of atheism. In other words,
atheism is the idea that one is not religated to reality as explained in section
one; it is to see oneself without obligation
to reality. Levinas, perhaps influenced by
Zubiri, uses the word “atheism,” correctly,
to refer to the state of pure autonomy, the
understanding of the self as self-ruling.
However, it is important to notice that the
atheist is still nevertheless religated; one
thing an atheist (or a solipsist, who is
equally atheistic perhaps) cannot do, even
if she or he controls everything else in life,
is pick when to be born. Atheism is only a
possibility in light of religated reality. The
reality of religation is deity, and atheists
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experience the deity by being a moment of
it, just like theists do.
The difference comes at the move from
divinity to God. The atheist, Zubiri says,
“affirms that he is God, and that he is sufficient unto himself;” however, “this is not
properly denying God, but rather disputing over who it is that is God.”53 The atheist is the one who proves the prime mover,
and claims that she or he is it. Atheism is
a claim of self-divinity; that the atheist is
the reality de suyo of all real things.
Zubiri correctly points out that there is
still a “God” involved here; it is just that
the atheist claims the title for her- or himself. A great Levinasian either-or emerges.
Who is the divinity, the de suyo of the reality of things that I find myself implanted
in: me or the Other (God)? Finally, on a
Heideggerian note, Zubiri suggests that
atheism is a deficient mode, an inauthentic mode, of the problem of God: “Atheism
is not … the primary situation of man. If
man is constitutively religated, the problem will not be in discovering God, but in
the possibility of covering Him.”54 Atheism
is the ignoring of the obligation to be
found in religation. We can now say that
true theism is the state of being open as
the site of reality, both de suyo and of
things (to borrow from Heidegger’s notion
of “discoveredness”), and atheism is the
deficient mode of this discoveredness, covering over the fact of religation. True atheism is impossible, just as for Heidegger
there is no pure inauthenticity; the inauthentic, even in spite of itself, reveals the
truth about Dasein. Likewise, atheism on
Zubiri’s model reveals the religation of true
theism, even when it is trying to supercede
or ignore it.
Unamuno
Unamuno believes that human beings
seek God because they desire immortality.
All rational attempts to prove God either
fail or reach the wrong God—the God-Idea,
a no-God. Unamuno believes that one can
rationally prove that there is no immortality, and that there is no God. However,

given Unamuno’s suspicions about rationality and its abstract methods, one can be
a theist in spite of evidence, be the evidence for or against the existence of God.
Atheism cannot be merely the adherence
to the truth of the arguments that there is
no immortality or that God does not exist.
No one is truly a theist on these grounds,
so neither can one be an atheist.
Being human is more about volition
than reason for Unamuno. Therefore, true
atheism would have to be a particular volition, a volition to not continue eternally in
one’s unity or continuity. Atheists seek
consolation for the tragic sense of life in
reason, and reason leads them to confirm
their fears, that they will die, and that will
be it. They then become upset with what
they see as the “ignorant consolation” had
by believers in God, and deep down inside
wish that they, too, could have such consolation. This is what Unamuno calls
odium anti-theologicum, an anti-theological
hatred, of human life. Simply put, for
Unamuno, atheists are those who hate
their lives, those who wish they had been
someone other than who they are, those
who shake their fists at God for giving
them such a crappy lot. Unamuno clings
to the last one: atheists, according to
Unamuno, are those who hate God for
giving them the taste of life only to withdraw it at death. As Unamuno writes,
“[n]ote the greater part of our atheists and
you will see that they are atheists from a
kind of rage, rage at not being able to believe that there is a God. They are personal enemies of God … their No-God is an
Anti-God.”55 God is always personal; those
who seek God love God—those who do not
seek hate God.
But either way one looks at it, theistically or atheistically, loving or hating, human beings face the tragic sense of life,
which sets up the relationship with God of
one sort or the other. Unamuno doubts
that anyone can truly be an atheist; proclaimed atheists are those who have simply been defeated by the tragic sense of
life. In other words, atheists are those
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who see life as a curse instead of a blessing. Life is tragic, but life is what we have.
Life is suffering; we suffer, God suffers—
theism is the undying fight to suffer forever, to experience what Unamuno calls,
citing St. Theresa of Avila, “sweet-tasting
suffering:” “Suffering is a spiritual thing …
A man who had never known suffering …
would scarcely possess consciousness of
himself.”56
Unamuno writes that the tragic sense
of life, the battle between the head and the
heart, is the fight between atheism and
theism, reason and life, nothingness and
God. True atheism is impossible because
the battle rages on:
“The wicked man hath said in his
heart, There is no God.” And this is
truth. For in his head the righteous
man may say to himself, God does not
exist! But only the wicked can say it
in his heart. Not to believe that there
is a God or to believe that there is not
a God, is one thing; to resign oneself
to there not being a God is another
thing, and it is a terrible and inhuman
thing; but not to wish that there be a
God exceeds every other moral monstrosity; although, as a matter of fact,
those who deny God deny Him because of their despair at not finding
Him.57
Even those who do not wish that there
is a God do so only because they despair
at the futility of their previous desires.
However, at an existential level, the hope
is still there. After all, atheists do not all
commit suicide upon being convinced that
life is pointless.
However, the best expressions of
Unamuno’s views about atheism are not
found in his essays or books. Unamuno is
probably most famous in Spanish literature for his poetry. “The Atheist’s Prayer,”

found in Unamuno’s Rosario de sonetos
líricos (Rosary of Lyrical Sonnets), and
printed at the beginning of this essay,
shows how important God is, even to an
atheist (which Unamuno was constantly
accused of being due to his rejection of
rational proofs and other tenants of Catholicism). Like all sonnets, there is a
distinct change of tone between the opening octet and the closing sextet. In the
octet, Unamuno describes how God is
nothing but an attempt to console oneself
from the tragic sense of life. Stories of
God are like fables told to children to help
them fall asleep. However, it is the sextet
that reveals the motive behind the atheist’s concern about God, and the true
prayer begins. Unamuno’s atheist in the
sonnet says the magic words, words that
bind Unamuno with Zubiri: es muy angosta / la realidad por mucho que se espande / para abarcarte. Reality is steadfast, and forces me to deal with God, regardless of the attempts to put God to rest
once and for all. I need God’s existence,
because if God were to exist, then I would
truly also exist [eternally].
Conclusion
Zubiri and Unamuno offer a unique
way of rethinking the existence of God in a
way that moves beyond the traditional
philosophical methods of proving God’s
existence and also overcomes the threat of
atheism. Being human is the foundation
of all inquiries into God, and the failure to
address that foundation leads to a God
that is never worth proving, or to no God
at all. By grounding theism in the existential foundation of being human, both thinkers have navigated a new path towards
how we know/love/are/live/create God,
and how in turn God knows/loves/
is/lives/creates us.
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